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BSTRACT
 
This essay analyzes the impact of the 2007 elections in Turkey on the structure
of the parliamentary elites. The article begins with an examination of the recent trends in
turnover rates. The electoral earthquake of 2002 resulted in the highest turnover in modern
Turkish politics. In 2007, the turnover rate declined to 59.3 percent as a result of the relative
stabilization of party competition. In the subsequent sections of the essay, the data on the
social backgrounds of the deputies with respect to age, gender, occupation, education, and
knowledge of the Arabic language are examined. The analysis reveals some notable differ-
ences as well as similarities between the political parties that entered the Grand National
Assembly in 2007. Of particular importance is the fact that 73 out of 341 AKP deputies know
Arabic, presumably as a result of their training at the Imam-Hatip schools. The essay
concludes with the observation that the AKP’s decisive electoral victories in 2002 and 2007
have facilitated the rise of a new political class of parliamentary elites in Turkey.
 
The July 2007 parliamentary elections reinforced the ruling Justice and Development
Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) dominant role in Turkish politics. By
capturing 341 out of the 550 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the
AKP, a political party with an Islamist pedigree, far outdistanced its rivals in the
party system in terms of both popular support and parliamentary strength.
 
1
 
 In addi-
tion to the AKP, the center–left Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,
CHP) and the far-right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP)
also managed to win 112 and 70 seats, respectively.
 
2
 
 The opening of the new legis-
lative session witnessed the emergence of two other small parties as well. The pre-
election coalition between the two center–left parties, the CHP and the Democratic
Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), proved to be short-lived since 13 of its
newly elected members left it to form the DSP’s parliamentary group. In addition, 20
out of 26 deputies who had won their seats as independents changed their status
following the elections to function as members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic
Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP). However, these changes did not
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alter the AKP’s dominance in the parliamentary arena. As was the case after the 2002
elections, the AKP enjoyed a comfortable majority and formed the government by
itself without the need to find coalition partners.
How has the AKP’s emergence as the strongest party since 2002 affected the
structure of Turkey’s parliamentary elites? Have there been major changes in the
social composition of parliament following the rise to power of a political party that
emerged out of Turkey’s Islamist movement? Have the collapse of the old order in
the party system and the marginalization of several traditional parties led to the rise
of a new political class?
 
Trends in Parliamentary Turnover
 
Since 1950, Turkey has experienced considerably high turnover rates among the
country’s representatives serving in the Grand National Assembly.
 
3
 
 The average
turnover rate in the 15 national elections held since 1950, 63.3 percent, is almost
double that of the democratic countries in Western Europe and North America. With
the exception of Canada, which had an average parliamentary turnover of 53 percent
between 1980 and 1993, the average turnover rate in other Western democracies was
about 31 percent during this period.
 
4
 
 Changes in the membership of the democrati-
cally elected parliamentary bodies generally stem from one of three major sources:
retirement, electoral defeat, and the addition of new seats.
 
5
 
 In Turkey, all of these
factors have been responsible for legislative turnover. Scores of deputies have not
become candidates in the next elections (or have died), the electoral defeats of their
parties have either permanently or temporarily ended the parliamentary careers of
many politicians, and the number of seats in the Grand National Assembly has
increased over the years through the creation of new electoral districts. In addition,
several other factors have contributed to Turkey’s exceptionally high turnover. The
most important concerns regime changes and military coups during periods of major
political crises. Three of the four highest rates of legislative turnover took place
following the 1950, 1961, and 1983 elections (Figure 1). The 1950 elections came in
the wake of a major regime change, when the beginning of honest and free elections
witnessed the replacement of the ruling CHP with its main challenger, the Democratic
Party (Demokrat Parti, DP). The DP’s victory resulted in the entry of a large number
of new elites into parliament.
 
6
 
 Military interventions in politics in 1960 and 1980 had
a similar effect regarding the turnover of parliamentary elites. In both cases, the
breakdown of democracy and the efforts of the ruling officers to tinker with electoral
politics had major consequences for the country’s party system and parliamentary
politics.
 
7
 
 While the 1960 coup led to the banning of Turkey’s largest party, the DP,
the same fate awaited all political parties 20 years later in the aftermath of the 1980
military takeover. The bans imposed on political parties and their leadership cadres
by the military regimes were largely responsible for the high turnover in the first elec-
tions held following the transfer of power back to the elected elites in 1961 and 1983.
In addition to regime changes, two other factors have also contributed to the replace-
ment of incumbent parliamentary elites. First, high rates of electoral volatility have
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led to abrupt rises and falls in the political fortunes of parties and their parliamentary
strengths. An extreme case in point is the sharp drop in the DSP’s votes from 22.3
percent in 1999 to 1.2 percent in 2002. As a result, although the DSP had the largest
number of seats in 1999, it failed to enter parliament in the next elections. Second,
due to the centralization of the nominating process, party leaders have managed to
exclude large numbers of incumbent deputies from the party lists or to demote them
to the lower, electorally hopeless places on these lists.
 
8
 
Figure 1. Parliamentary turnover rates in Turkey, 1950–2007 (%).
 
The highest turnover rate in the history of Turkey’s electoral politics was
recorded in 2002, when 89.1 percent of the incumbents lost their seats. Unlike in
1961 or 1983, this strikingly high turnover resulted from the shifting of voter align-
ments in party competition rather than the military’s political engineering strategies.
The political earthquake of 2002 enabled two parties, the AKP and the CHP, which
were not present in the previous parliament to become the two largest parties in the
new legislature. At the same time, four traditional parties—the True Path Party
(Do
 
[gbrev]
 
ru Yol Partisi, DYP), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), the
DSP, and the MHP—which had collectively won nearly 80 percent of the seats in
1999—failed to clear the 10 percent national electoral threshold that parties must
pass in order to qualify for seats. Consequently, the outcome of the 2002 elections
led to the replacement of almost the entire membership of the Grand National
Assembly. The collapse of the old order in the party system and the emergence of
the newly formed AKP as the dominant force in electoral politics turned the chal-
lengers of yesterday into the new parliamentary elites.
In 2007, the turnover rate declined to 59.3 percent. Although still high in compar-
ison to West European and North American democracies, it was nevertheless
slightly below the average turnover rate. A total of 233 out of 550 deputies in the
new parliament had served in the previous legislature of 2002 to 2007. The decrease
in turnover reflected the relative stabilization of party competition after the turbu-
lence that the party system had experienced in 2002. Following the balloting in July
˘
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2007, the AKP and the CHP remained as the parliament’s two largest parties, which
helped scores of incumbents to keep their seats. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
approximately 60 percent of the incumbents lost their seats in 2007. One major
reason for this relatively high turnover rate was the centralization of the nomination
process. The leaders of both the AKP (Tayyip Erdo
 
[gbrev] an) and the CHP (Deniz
Baykal) succeeded in their efforts to purge sizeable numbers of the incumbent depu-
ties from their party lists. As a result, the reelection rates for the AKP and the CHP
were 46.6 percent and 29.4 percent, respectively (Figure 2). This means that more
than half the AKP deputies who entered the legislature in 2002 enjoyed a short
tenure, while two-thirds of the CHP’s outgoing representatives were absent in the
new parliament. Another factor that contributed to the turnover rate in 2007
concerned the entry of the MHP, DSP, and DTP into parliament. None of these
parties were present in the previous session of parliament.
 
Figure 2. Reelection of deputies in 2007 (%).The analysis of the data on parliamentary turnover in 2007 reveals that variations
in electoral geography produced significant regional differences (Figure 3). Clearly,
the eastern and southeastern regions led the others in terms of the proportion of “new
faces” who were elected to the Grand National Assembly. The electoral successes of
the DTP and the AKP in the country’s predominantly Kurdish-populated regions
were largely responsible for the high turnover in these two regions. Nineteen of the
DTP’s 20 deputies were elected from the eastern and southeastern Anatolian regions.
The AKP, which became the DTP’s chief rival for Kurdish votes in these two regions
in 2007, nominated many individuals who had not been members of the previous
parliament. In fact, the east and the southeast accounted for the two highest turnover
rates for the AKP among all of Turkey’s eight regions.
 
Figure 3. Parliamentary replacement by geographic region in 2007 (%).
 
One of the major consequences of the collapse of the old order in the party system
and the AKP’s emergence as the majority party in parliament in 2002 was the large
˘
Figure 2. Reelection of deputies in 2007 (%).
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number of “freshmen,” or first-time parliamentarians, who entered the Grand
National Assembly (Figure 4).
 
Figure 4. First-time deputies in 1999, 2002, and 2007 (%).
 
First-time deputies accounted for 80.5 percent of the parliamentarians in 2002,
which meant that this legislature had one of the lowest numbers of deputies with
previous parliamentary experience in the history of the Republic. In 2007, the
proportion of first-time deputies decreased to 49.3 percent, or nearly half the parlia-
mentary representatives. The decline in the number of freshmen was partly due to
the decline in the turnover rate in 2007.
The number of first-time deputies varied considerably between the parties. The
AKP and the CHP had approximately the same number of freshmen deputies in their
Figure 3. Parliamentary replacement by geographic region in 2007 (%).
Figure 4. First-time deputies in 1999, 2002, and 2007 (%).
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parliamentary groups (Figure 5). Nearly half their representatives were men and
women who had never sat in the Grand National Assembly before and consequently
had no previous parliamentary experience. The DTP’s parliamentary group included
the highest proportion of freshmen in its ranks, since only two of its 20 deputies had
been members of parliament before. Another party with a high percentage of first-
time deputies was the MHP, whose ranks included a large number of individuals
without any previous parliamentary experience. Among all parties in the legislature,
the DSP had the lowest proportion of first-time deputies. This was partly due to its
electoral victory in 1999, when the DSP won the largest number of seats and served
as the senior member of the coalition governments between 1999 and 2002. A
number of these former DSP deputies reentered the parliament in 2007 through their
party’s electoral coalition with the CHP.
 
Figure 5. First-time deputies by party affiliation in 2007 (%).The pros and cons of high turnover in democratically elected legislative bodies
have received extensive scholarly attention.
 
9
 
 According to some observers, higher
rates of turnover undermine the effectiveness of parliaments by limiting the number
of experienced legislators who have the expertise to deal with complex domestic and
foreign policy issues. Additionally, the institutionalization of a parliament is hindered
by large numbers of inexperienced members who are not knowledgeable about the
rules and norms of the parliamentary game of politics. However, there are also others
who believe that elite turnover is helpful for the functioning of democratic systems
since it may lead to greater policy innovation and flexibility. Moreover, the propo-
nents of this latter view argue that high turnover opens up career opportunities for
greater numbers of individuals to enter into the ranks of the political elites than would
have been possible otherwise.
Studies on the Turkish Grand National Assembly have tended to emphasize the
adverse impact of high turnover among deputies on the institutionalization of parlia-
mentary politics and behavior. According to Ersin Kalaycıo
 
[gbrev]
 
lu, for example, the
presence of large numbers of first-time deputies after each election means that the
parliament “has to start almost from scratch in the establishment of binding rules
and guiding rules of legislative conduct.”
 
10
 
 In addition to the frequency, the manner
in which parliamentary elites have been replaced in Turkey presents problems from
˘
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the perspective of democratic theory and practice.
 
11
 
 As noted earlier, large numbers
of parliamentary elites were replaced in the 1961 and 1983 elections as a result of
the 1960 and 1980 military coups. The forced and unconstitutional exit of incum-
bent deputies through military intervention along with the efforts of the ruling offic-
ers to ban scores of political elites from reentering parliament during the transition
back to democracy have not only affected turnover rates but have also impeded
progress toward the consolidation of democracy. Moreover, the power of the
Turkish party leaders to control the nomination process has played an important role
in the frequent changes of parliamentary personnel. The centralization of candidate
selection is a major obstacle to internal party democracy since the incumbent depu-
ties are almost exclusively dependent on the party leaders for their nomination in the
next elections.
 
Who Are the New Parliamentary Elites?
 
Comparative research on members of parliaments has shown that most representa-
tives who serve in the world’s democratically elected legislative bodies tend to be
drawn disproportionably from among the better-educated and more affluent middle-
aged men who have professional occupations (for example, lawyers and business-
men).
 
12
 
 These studies have also established that there has been a persistent under-
representation of women, blue-collar workers, young people, and less affluent
individuals. The data collected on parliamentarians over several decades of research
clearly demonstrate that there is a basic disparity in the social compositions of
parliamentary elites and the voters who elect them in terms of age, gender, occupa-
tion, and education. Previous studies on parliamentary elites in Turkey have also
underscored similar disparities between Turkish society and members of the Grand
National Assembly.
 
13
 
In many respects, the social profile of the deputies in the aftermath of the July
2007 elections did not deviate significantly from that of the parliamentary elites in
most other democracies.
 
14
 
 With respect to age, the newly elected members of parlia-
ment were predominantly middle-aged, with those belonging to the 50–54 age
group accounting for nearly a quarter of the legislature’s membership (Table 1).
The average age of the parliamentarians increased from 48.4 percent in 2002 to
50.8 in 2007. The relative “aging” of Turkey’s parliamentary elites is also reflected
in the declining proportion of younger deputies and in the rising number of older
ones. The proportion under 40 was nearly halved in 2007, while those who were 60
years or older increased from 9.1 percent in 2002 to 15.1 percent five years later.
 
15
 
Data on the age structure of the deputies show that there has not been a fundamental
change in the average age of those elected to parliament during more than half a
century of multiparty politics in Turkey.
 
16
 
Gender has traditionally constituted one of the largest discrepancies between the
social characteristics of Turkey’s population and the parliamentarians who serve in
the Grand National Assembly. During the first decades of the Republican era, the
country’s authoritarian single-party regime “selected” a small number of women to
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become members of parliament after they obtained the right to vote in 1935.
However, following the transition to democracy, even this limited representation
declined to a miniscule level (Figure 6). The number of female deputies rose slightly
in 1983, then declined again in the next two elections, followed by modest increases
between 1995 and 2002. The 2007 elections witnessed an important change since
the number of female deputies virtually doubled. This increase was primarily due to
two factors. First, the two largest parties, the AKP and the CHP, made a concerted
effort to nominate more female candidates and to place them on the more winnable
places on the party lists than before.
 
17
 
 As a result, the percentage of female deputies
increased from 3.6 to 8.8 in the AKP and from 6.2 to 9.2 in the CHP between 2002
and 2007. Second, a newcomer to parliamentary politics, the DTP, adopted a
40 percent affirmative action quota to boost women’s representation.
 
18
 
Figure 6. Women deputies in the Parliament, 1935–2007 (%).7
 
by party affiliation in 2002 and 2007 (%).Consequently, women comprised 40 percent of the DTP’s deputies, which was by
far the highest proportion among all parties represented in parliament. The MHP, on
the other hand, had the lowest percentage of women deputies in its ranks. Although
political parties increasingly seem to recognize the electoral advantage of nominat-
ing female candidates, the fact that Turkey’s parliament includes less than 10 percent
female deputies compares poorly with recent trends in Western European democra-
cies, where the number of women serving in national legislatures, as well as those
holding ministerial positions in cabinets, has increased significantly.
 
19
 
Since the early days of the modern Turkish Republic, education has played a
crucial role in the chances of individuals to enter the ranks of the parliamentary
elites.
 
20
 
 This trend has remained in full force over the years, and political parties,
irrespective of their ideological orientations, have shown a distinct preference for
nominating well-educated candidates. As a result, an overwhelming majority of
the elected elites have been the products of the Turkish higher education system
(Table 2). The proportion of university graduates declined slightly in 2002 but rose
again to reach 94.5 percent in 2007. As in the case of gender, there is a major
discrepancy between the voters and their representatives regarding education, since
university graduates accounted for only 9 percent of the population in the country in
 
Table 1.
 
Deputies’ Age in 1999, 2002, and 2007 (%)
1999 2002 2007
30–34 2.5 5.6 2.6
35–39 9.5 11.5 7.3
40–44 19.1 14.2 16.1
45–49 25.6 24.0 16.2
50–54 21.1 21.8 24.5
55–59 12.0 13.8 18.2
60 and Over 10.2 9.1 15.1
Total 100 100 100
Average 48.9 48.4 50.8
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
TÜ
BT
AK
 E
KU
AL
] 
At
: 
11
:2
4 
15
 S
ep
te
mb
er
 2
00
8
 The 2007 Elections and Parliamentary Elites in Turkey
 
353
 
Figure 6.
 
Women deputies in the parliament, 1935–2007 (%).
Figure 7. Women deputies by party affiliation in 2002 and 2007 (%).
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2004.
 
21
 
 As Table 2 indicates, the number of parliamentarians who have had only
elementary school training has decreased to a miniscule level.
Analysis of the data on the educational levels of the deputies according to their
party affiliations shows that there are some differences between parties (Table 3).
For example, all of the DSP’s deputies are university graduates, whereas those who
hold a university degree account for 70 percent of the DTP’s parliamentarians. It is
instructive to note that while the CHP has been the perennial favorite of the better-
educated voters, its deputies do not have the highest educational attainment among
the parties that hold seats in parliament. Also worth noting is that although nearly all
of the AKP’s representatives in the legislature are university graduates, the AKP is
also the only party that includes several deputies who have not advanced beyond
elementary school.
The high degree of educational attainment among parliamentary elites in Turkey
is also reflected in their knowledge of foreign languages. The official biographies
of the deputies, based on the information provided by them, indicate that many
profess to speak at least one foreign language. There are also scores of deputies
who claim competence in more than one foreign language. English seems to be
the favorite second language of many who serve in the Grand National Assem-
bly. The dominance of English represents a notable change from the early decades
of the Republic, when most of the parliamentarians “who knew a foreign language
knew French.”
 
22
 
 In addition to “Western” languages such as English, French, or
German, Arabic is also spoken by a substantial number of parliamentary elites. In
1999, 11.8 percent of the deputies claimed competency in the Arabic language.
Most of them belonged to the two center–right parties, ANAP and the DYP (Table
4). However, in 2007 a clear majority of the parliamentarians who knew Arabic
 
Table 2.
 
Educational Level of Deputies, 1999, 2002, and 2007 (%)
Elementary Middle Lycee University Total
1999 1.1 1.8 5.6 91.5 100.0
2002 1.5 2.2 6.2 90.2 100.0
2007 0.4 0.4 4.7 94.5 100.0
 
Table 3.
 
Educational Level of Deputies by Party Affiliation in 2007 (%)
Elementary Middle Lycee University Total
AKP 0.3 0.6 2.9 96.2 100.0
CHP 0.0 0.0 8.2 91.8 100.0
DSP 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
DTP 0.0 0.0 30.0 70.0 100.0
MHP 0.0 0.0 2.9 97.1 100.0
Total 0.4 0.4 4.7 94.5 100.0
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were elected from the AKP. Parliamentary elites in Turkey are likely to know
Arabic, either by having been born in provinces where Arabic is widely spoken
such as Hatay, Mardin, or 
 
[Scedil]
 
anlıurfa or by attending educational institutions that
specialize in teaching religious knowledge, norms, and traditions, such as the
Imam-Hatip schools (
 
[Idot ] mam-Hatip okulları
 
) and Higher Islamic Institutes (
 
Yüksek 
 
[Idot
] slam Enstitüleri
 
). Whereas the very tiny percentage of CHP deputies who profess
an ability to speak Arabic belong to the first group, a large majority of the AKP’s
parliamentarians who know Arabic were not born in the provinces where Arabic is
widely spoken.
 
23
 
 It is safe to assume, therefore, that they learned it in the educa-
tional institutions where religious training is emphasized. The presence of substan-
tial numbers of individuals who are products of these institutions among the
AKP’s parliamentary elites and in the party’s leadership ranks is an important indi-
cator of the party’s origins and its support for a greater role for Islam in Turkish
society and public affairs. The fact that 73 out of 341 AKP deputies profess to
speak Arabic whereas only a handful of CHP parliamentarians do so also suggests
a very strong cleavage between the two parties that “represent[s] two distinct polit-
ical and social subcultures based on opposing views regarding religion’s role in
public affairs.”
 
24
 
In terms of the occupations represented in the legislature, Turkey has witnessed
some significant changes over the years. During the early years of the Republic,
individuals with backgrounds in the bureaucracy and the military comprised a large
proportion of the members of the Grand National Assembly. The democratization
of Turkish politics in the aftermath of World War II was accompanied by a growing
number of deputies with backgrounds in the free professions such as law or medi-
cine. In more recent times, other occupations have also become prominent. The
data on the occupational profile of those who won seats in 2007 show that parlia-
mentarians with backgrounds in an occupation categorized as “economic and busi-
ness” (business professionals and managers, traders, bankers, financial consultants,
and owners of small or medium-sized businesses) have the highest representation in
the Grand National Assembly (Table 5). The number of deputies with this particu-
lar occupational background has increased steadily in the last three elections.
Educators, lawyers, and engineers constitute the next three largest occupations
among the elected elites. In comparison with the parliaments of the 1960s and
1970s, the number of educators has risen significantly, to the point where they
became the second largest occupational group in 2007. The ranks of the educators
include scores of university professors and researchers along with secondary school
¸
˙
I˙
 
Table 4.
 
Deputies’ Knowledge of Arabic by Party Affiliation, 1999, 2002, and 2007 (%)
AKP ANAP CHP DSP DTP DYP FP MHP Total
2007 21.5 5.1 0.0 5.0 5.0 14.8
2002 21.4 6.2 16.2
1999 12.6 6.6 9.6 25.0 6.8 11.8
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teachers and administrators. Similar to most other national legislatures, parliaments
in Turkey have traditionally included large numbers of lawyers. In 2007, 15.9
percent of the deputies were members of the legal profession. Engineers have
played a very prominent role in Turkish politics since the 1960s.
 
25
 
 Some of the
country’s leading political figures, such as Süleyman Demirel, Turgut Özal, and
Necmettin Erbakan, were educated at the Istanbul Technical University and began
their careers in various fields of engineering. It is instructive that several occupa-
tions that had traditionally large representations in the legislatures, such as the mili-
tary and agriculture, have virtually disappeared from the Grand National Assembly
in recent years.
That Turkey’s parliament had become more homogenous with respect to the
occupations of the deputies became evident in the studies conducted in the 1970s
and 1980s.
 
26
 
 This trend has continued over the years. In 2007, the occupational
profiles of the parliamentarians from the AKP and the CHP were quite similar
(Table 6). The majority of the deputies in the two largest parties are businessmen,
educators, lawyers, and engineers. It is interesting to note, however, that the propor-
tion of businessmen in the CHP is slightly higher than that of the AKP. While the
occupational backgrounds of the deputies in other parties did not deviate signifi-
cantly from the overall trends, there were some differences. For example, the MHP
had the highest proportion of former civil servants, educators, and military officers
in its parliamentary group, while the DTP ranked first in terms of the proportion of
lawyers among its deputies.
The degree of localism—or the percentage of deputies who were born in the
electoral constituency that they represent—in the Grand National Assembly has
 
Table 5.
 
Occupations of Deputies, 1999, 2002, and 2007 (%)
Occupation 1999 2002 2007
Economics/Business 20.2 22.7 25.9
Education 19.8 18.2 19.5
Law 13.6 15.3 15.9
Engineering 18.9 16.2 15.9
Government 5.5 7.5 4.6
Medicine 5.1 3.8 3.5
Dentistry, Pharmacy, and Vet. Med. 3.5 3.6 2.7
Journalism 2.4 1.6 2.0
Art and Architecture 1.1 1.6 1.8
Agriculture 2.4 1.8 1.5
Military 0.5 0.0 0.7
Labor Union 0.5 1.1 0.7
Religion 1.8 0.9 0.4
Other 4.7 5.6 4.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
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increased steadily since the formative years of the Republic, from the 1920s to the
1940s, when many deputies were not locally born. However, the advent of multi-
party politics significantly increased the number of parliamentarians with strong
roots in the constituencies from which they were elected. In the nine parliaments
from 1950 to 1983, deputies who were born in the constituency they represented
averaged 67 percent.
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 In more recent years, the degree of localism increased from
63.6 percent in 1999, to 67.5 percent in 2002, and finally reached 75.2 percent in
2007 (Table 7). As this trend indicates, political parties have become increasingly
interested in nominating candidates who have strong local connections. However,
the data on localism in the 2007 elections also reveal important differences both
between regions and political parties. For example, among Turkey’s seven major
geographic regions, Eastern Anatolia had the highest proportion of locally born
parliamentary elites. Nearly all of the deputies who represent Eastern Anatolian
constituencies were born in these provinces. The Black Sea region also had a very
high proportion of locally born deputies in 2007. The Marmara region, on the other
hand, ranked last in terms of deputies with local birth connections. Slightly less than
half the newly elected parliamentarians from this region were born in the provinces
that they represented. The relatively smaller proportion of the locally born deputies
in the Marmara region can be partly explained with reference to the massive flow of
migrants from other parts of Anatolia into the major cities located in the Marmara
region. In particular, the rapid expansion of Istanbul’s population has been accom-
panied by the changing composition of party activists in Turkey’s largest city,
where local political party organizations are largely staffed by individuals who are
not natives of Istanbul.
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Table 6.
 
Occupations of Deputies by Party Affiliation in 2007 (%)
Occupation AKP CHP DSP DTP MHP Total
Economics/Business 26.2 31.6 15.4 10.0 22.9 25.9
Education 18.8 18.4 23.1 10.0 27.1 19.5
Law 17.6 16.3 7.7 25.0 4.3 15.9
Engineering 16.2 17.3 15.4 5.0 17.1 15.9
Government 3.8 2.0 7.7 5.0 11.4 4.6
Medicine 3.5 4.1 7.7 0.0 2.9 3.5
Dent., Pharmacy, and Vet. Med. 2.9 3.1 0.0 5.0 0.0 2.7
Journalism 1.8 2.0 15.4 5.0 0.0 2.0
Art and Architecture 2.4 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
Agriculture 1.2 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.9 1.5
Military 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.7
Labor Union 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.7
Religion 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Other 4.1 2.0 7.7 30.0 5.7 4.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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The data presented in Table 7 also show that the degree of localism among deputies
varied significantly between political parties. Arguably, the most important differ-
ence is between the two major parties, the AKP and the CHP. Whereas the AKP had
the highest percentage of deputies with local roots (78.5 percent), the CHP had the
lowest percentage of locally born deputies (68.4 percent) in its parliamentary group.
It is evident that the AKP’s leadership gave greater importance than all other parties
to choosing candidates for parliament from among men and women who were locally
born. The only exception to the AKP’s policy was the Marmara region, where the
percentage of deputies without strong local ties was higher than the locally born. The
degree of localism among the CHP’s deputies, on the other hand, was considerably
lower in the Central Anatolian and Marmara regions than in other parts of Turkey.
 
Conclusions
 
As noted earlier, the 2002 elections witnessed the highest turnover rate in Turkey
since the beginning of free and honest elections in 1950. The political and social
dynamics that propelled the newly formed AKP to power with a solid majority in
2002 remained in force in 2007, when Turkey’s ruling party increased its electoral
support at the polls and continued its dominant role in party competition. As the data
presented in the preceding sections show, the AKP electoral victory in 2002 led to
a major change in the composition of the Grand National Assembly, since nearly
80 percent of the newly elected deputies had no previous parliamentary experience.
A majority of the “freshmen” in the legislature that emerged from the 2002 elections
belonged to the AKP. Several prominent AKP deputies, such as Abdullah Gül, had
previously served in parliament as members of Necmettin Erbakan’s pro-Islamist
parties in the 1990s (that is, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party). However, most
of the AKP’s newly elected members had never sat in parliament before. The ranks
of this large group of deputies include the AKP’s leader, Tayyip Erdo
 
[gbrev] an, who
entered parliament for the first time after winning a seat in a by-election that was
held in early 2003.
The large-scale replacement of parliamentary elites in Turkey in 2002 marked the
emergence of a new political class in the country.
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 As a result of the AKP’s success
˘
 
Table 7.
 
Deputies Born in Constituency Represented: By Political Party Affiliation, 2007 (%)
Mediterranean
Eastern 
Anatolia Aegean
Southeastern 
Anatolia
Central 
Anatolia
Black 
Sea Marmara Total
AKP 81.8 100.0 74.3 94.4 77.8 98.2 43.8 78.5
MHP 88.2 100.0 64.3 100.0 73.3 100.0 40.0 71.4
DTP 0.0 88.9 0.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.0
DSP 100.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 66.7 0.0 66.7 69.2
CHP 88.9 100.0 66.7 66.7 45.5 92.3 53.1 68.4
Total 85.5 98.3 69.0 86.3 73.1 96.1 46.9 75.2
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at the polls in 2007, this new political class has further consolidated its place and
power. In terms of such social background variables as age, education, or occupa-
tion, the AKP’s parliamentary elites do not differ radically from their counterparts
in the other political parties represented in the legislature. However, in one impor-
tant respect, namely, knowledge of the Arabic language, there is a significant differ-
ence between the AKP’s deputies and members of other parties. The fact that more
than one-fifth of the AKP’s deputies profess to know Arabic (most probably as a
result of their secondary school education at the Imam-Hatip schools) underscores a
major difference between the country’s traditional, pro-secular elites and the newly
emerging political class, which has been identified with the AKP’s electoral ascen-
dancy since 2002. Although the AKP’s leadership has recruited a number of indi-
viduals from the secularist elements in Turkish society and nominated them for
candidacy in the 2007 elections, the majority of the party’s parliamentary represen-
tatives support the adoption of traditional Islamic values, norms, and lifestyles.
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The fact that many of the AKP’s parliamentarians, including Prime Minister
Erdo
 
[gbrev]
 
an, favor covering their wives and regularly attend Friday noon prayers in one
of Ankara’s large mosques (at the expense of suspending parliamentary proceedings
for lack of quorum) is among some of the many indicators of their preference for
lifestyles that stand in sharp contrast to the lifestyles of their secularist counterparts.
As Ian Lesser has noted, 
individuals with more religious and traditional outlooks, products of religious
schools (
 
imam-hatip
 
), and those broadly in the AKP milieu have become more
visible in the infrastructure of the Turkish state, the interior and education
ministries, and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, long the exclusive
preserve of the Kemalist establishment.
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The emergence of a new political class of parliamentarians is an important part of
this process of change that Turkish politics, society, and economics have witnessed
in recent years. The shift of power from the country’s secularist establishment to the
emerging elites associated with the AKP is likely to continue in the near future as
Turkey’s ruling party further consolidates its power by controlling the country’s
major political institutions.
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